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The justices of the ColoradoSupreme Court have requestedDICTA
to republish their announcement that during the present acute paper
shortage, and until the further order of the court, the court will accept
ten copies of printed abstractsof records and briefs instead of the fifteen
copies required by rules 115 (a) and (b), and also that in Industrial
Commission cases two copies of typewritten briefs will be accepted in
lieu of the ten copies required by rule 115 (k).

When Corporate Stock Becomes Real Estate
By CHARLES J. BEISE*

Ordinarily, a lawyer thinks of a certificate of stock in an incorporated company as an instrument bearing many of the characteristics of a
negotiable instrument transferable by endorsement. And that is the
general impression of the legislature (1935 C. S. A., Ch. 41, Sec. 87).
However, by a process of judicial reasoning it has been established that
such stock is real property transferable by deed-at least so far as stock
in a mutual ditch company is concerned. This was the practical result of
the decision in Comstock v. Olney Springs DrainageDistrict.1
Ditch companies in Colorado ordinarily are incorporated under any
one of three statutes. 2 There are other possibilities for the formation of
entities organized for ditch construction," but thus far they have managed to stay out of court so far as the scope of this article is concerned,
as no stock is issued by them.3a
*Member of the Colorado bar. Attorney for United States Bureau of Reclamation,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
1
Comstock v. Olney Springs Drainage District, 97 Colo. 416, 50 Pac. (2d) 531
(1935).
21935 C. S. A., Ch. 41, SS. 141, 172. 210.
. 3WATER USERS' ASSOCIATIONS, 1935 C. S. A., Ch. 41, SS. 155 ff.; IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAW OF 1905, 1935 C. S. A., Ch. 90, S. 377; IRRIGATION LAW OF
1921, 1935 C. S. A., Ch. 90, S. 432: PUBLIC IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAW OF
1935, 1935 C. S. A., Ch. 90, S. 472: COLORADO RIVER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
1935 C. S. A., SupP., Ch. 138, S. 199 (1), S. L. 1937, Ch. 220, p. 997: WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, S. L. 1937, Ch. 266, p. 1309, amended S. L. 1939. Ch.
174, p. 592.
"A water users' association does issue stock.
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Generally speaking, ditch companies can be divided into two major
classes or divisions-"mutuals" and "quasi-public" corporations.
Where all owners of land within the service capacity of the
canal will possess the right as members of the public to use the
water which may be diverted into such canal the use is clearly public and the company is therefore a public agency--on the other
hand where several separate owners of water rights by appropriation form a corporation for the purpose of distributing water to
themselves alone, the use is not thereby rendered a public one * *
Thus, in a mutual company shares of stock represent specific quantities
of water and a right to supply rests on stock ownership.' But a "mutual" company can become a "quasi-public" company when by a course
of practice it no longer insists on stock ownership before delivering water
and it thereby enters public service.67 A transition by such course of conduct has been declared in Colorado.
"Quasi-public" ditch companies ordinarily dispose of their water
and ditch space by annual contracts,8 or by deed conveying water rights
and reserving the right to levy annual charges and to make rules and regulations.9 Transfer of water rights of consumers or customers is consequently made by written assignment of the water contract or by deed
conveying the water rights. The law was well summarized by Judge
L.ewis1 ° when he said:
If I rightly understand these cases, they hold: (1) the owner
of the carrying ditch in making the diversion from the natural
stream acts solely as the agent or trustee for him who applies the
water to a beneficial use, (2) gets no title in or right to the use of
the water and has no property in it subject to disposal, and (3)
he who applies the water thus diverted to beneficial use acquires a
property right in the use of the water thus applied which he, and
he only, can sell, dispose of and convey by deed separate and apart
from the land to which it has been applied or with the land to
which it has been applied. The last proposition is made more cer(3d ed. 1911) 1159.
Slbid. 1170.
61bid. 1175-1176.
"Combs .v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 17 Colo. 146, 28 Pac. 966 (1892). The
company apparently was incorporated under the general corporation laws and a restriction in the by-laws prohibited sale of water to anyone but a stockholder. The restriction was made ineffective by public sales of water and the ditch was held to be a quasipublic carrier.
'Commissioners v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 Pac. (2d)
373 (1938); Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 Pac. 44 (1914).
'Northern Colorado Irrigation Co. v. Commissioners, 95 Colo. 555, 38 Pac. (2d)
889 (1934).
0
'2 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES

" Pioneer Irrigation Co. v. Commissioners, 236 Fed. 790, 792 (D. Colo. 1916).
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tain by Strickler v. ColoradoSprings, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313, 25
Am. St. Rep. 245; (Cache la Poudre) Irrigation Co. v. Res. Co.,
25 Colo. 144, 148, 53 P. 318, 71 Am. St. Rep. 123.
Thus relatively few cases exist concerning transfer of water rights in a
"quasi-public" ditch company."
The confusion arises in cases involving the transfer of shares of
stock in "mutual "companies. Are such rights to water transferable by
deed or by delivery of the stock certificate?
Kinney 12 in approaching this field ventured the following observation:
* * * But, where the title to water rights, and the ditch, canal,
and other works, is in one of these mutual corporations, which
issues shares of stock representing both the water rights and the
works by means of which the water rights are used, such shares are
considered in law personal property, and a sale and transfer of these
shares operate as a sale and transfer of both the water rights and
the interest in the works. * * *
and the editors of Corpus Juris qualified this general statement:
Stock, not appmartenant to land, is personal property, and,
under a statute so providing, no stock is appurtenant to land unless
the corporation adopts and records in the county recorder's office a
by-law declaring it to be appurtenant to land. A by-law declaring
that stock shall be located only an land of the purchaser and that
water shall be distributed only on lands on which stock is located,
does not make such stock appurtenant to the land, but by a by-law
providing that stockholder shall be entitled to water only for land
described in the certificate, or a by-law providing that stock is transferable only with land, does make it appurtenant. * * *13
thereby emphasizing the importance of provisions in the corporate charter, by-law and stock certificate limiting the use of water represented by
the certificate to lands described therein.
The Colorado decisions can be divided into three major divisions:
(I) cases involving the taxation of such water stock and involuntary
transfers thereof by tax deed; (2) voluntary transfers resulting from
credit tranf;actions, and (3) taxation of the property of irrigation com"Most cases involving quasi-public ditch companies are actions to determine the
rate of charge for the conveyance of water. See Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co.. 10 Colo. 582, 17 Pac. 487 (1887); Wright v. Platte Valley Irrigation Co.,
27 Colo. 322, 61 Pac. 603 (1903), and cases cited in notes 8 and 9 supra. Stock in
such companies is held for profit, not for water alone.
"23 KINNEY. IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS (2d ed. 1912) 2669.
1-67 C. J. 1368 (S. 1103).
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panies or districts. The latter cases [under (3) ] have little in common
with the subject but are cited as precedents by our court.
Consider first the decisions involving the taxation of shares of stock
of a mutual ditch company. Commissioners of Montezuma County v.
Cortez Land Co.1 4 was a statutory proceeding to cancel an assessment of
general taxes against stock in a mutual ditch company which had issued
stock on the basis of one share per acre of land served. There was, however, no provision making the water represented by the certificate appurtenant to any particular described tract. The court decided that article
10, section 3 of Colorado's constitution controlled and if the ditch system itself was exempt from taxation, the stock which represented merely
an interest in the ditch was likewise exempt. This decision apparently
was reversed in effect in Beatty tv. Commissioners"s for the reason that
the stock was assessed as an "improvement on the land" and not as stock
in a company. This decision drew a sharp dissent from Justice Bouck
on the ground that the Cortez case was determinative of the issue.
It is worthy of note that although Justice Bouck states the two
cases to be "on all fours," the report of each case shows this differencethe stock certificates in the Beatty case:
described her 458 acres of land as the limited situs of the application
of the water she was entitled to receive from the canal
and the by-laws required:
Each certificate of stock shall designate the lands upon which
the stockholder intends to apply the water represented by the certificate and such water shall not be applied to any other land than
that specified in the certificate.
The writer believes this distinction is the crux of the entire subject under
discussion, although the court lays little emphasis on this point and prefers to discuss "mutual companies" as distinguished from "corporations
organized for profit," and refers to the Comstock decision., l" The
Comstock case was decided two years before the Beatty case. The Cornstock decision held that title to shares of stock passed by treasurer's tax
deed (woe the secretary of the ditch company in trying to keep up a
stock ledger). The majority opinion merely affirmed the lower court's
finding. It is the concurring opinion that unfortunately causes the difficulty and often is cited improperly.
"81 Colo. 266, 254 Pac. 996 (1927).
"'101 Colo. 346, 73 Pac. (2d) 982 (1937).
8
" Comstock v. Olney Springs Drainage District, 97 Colo. 416, 50 Pac. (2d)
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(1935).
T
It may be that the Cortez case involved a ditch company with similarly restrictive
provisions as to the place for the use of water. If so, that does not appear in the report
and Mr. Justice Bouck's comments certainly are in point.
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The following quotation in the concurring opinion is often referred to:
(1) Counsel for the plaintiff in error admit-and it is the
law-that water rights for irrigation are real property. They say,
however, that shares of stock are personal property. That is true
of shares of stock in corporations, including irrigation corporations, organized for profit; but where the- company is a mutual
irrigation company, or, as here, a mutual reservoir company, organized, not for profit, but for the convenience of its members in
the management of the irrigation system and in the distribution to
them of water upon their lands in proportion to their respective
interests, ownership of shares of stock in the corporation is but
incidental to ownership of a water right, which is appurtenant to
the land upon which the water is used.
whereas this language (also in the concurring opinion) is overlooked:
(2) Moreover, a corporation may provide that the water
rights represented by the stock shall be attached to the land and
shall pass only with it. 3 Farnham, Water and Water Rights, p.
2001. The corporations in the present case provide that the water
rights represented by their stock shall be used only in connection
with the designated land.
and I submit that the Comstock and Beatty cases fall within the recognized distinction as used by Corpus Juris, supra.
The decisions involving voluntary transfers of stock in mutual
ditch companies are more numerous than the decisions involving taxation. The first decision, made in 1892,18 was in an injunction proceeding
in which the plaintiff who held tax certificates and a sheriff's deed to land
claimed title to two certificates of water stock not specifically described in
his deed and which represented water used for the irrigation of such land.
The stock certificates had been pledged with defendant. The opinion is
silent as to whether or not any restriction existed limiting place of use
of water. In denying the claim of plaintiff to the water stock, the court
said:
These (speaking of stock certificates) he could legally transfer
only by assignment on the books of the corporation.
and again:
Even though, under certain circumstances, such rights may
be considered appurtenant to the land-a point we do not decidethey may undoubtedly be severed from the land, and may be sold
and conveyed separate and apart therefrom; and where such sever'SOppenlander v. Left Hand Ditch Company, 18 Colo. 142, 31 Pac. 854 (1892).
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ance sale, and conveyance have taken place, as by the assignment
and sale of stock representing water rights in an incorporated ditch
company, a subsequent sale and conveyance of the land does not
pass the title to such water rights.
The decision makes the stock certificate and not the deed the test.
Three years later (1895) our court in the Hastings decision's had
to determine the ownership of shares of stock in an action between an
attaching creditor (bank) and a purchaser who had acquired possession
of the stock certificate prior to the levy but neglected to have the transfer
show on the ditch company's books. Both parties claimed under the
former owner. To support his claim defendant (purchaser of land)
offered his deed from original owner conveying "all the water rights in
any way pertaining or belonging to the land." The court said:
The deed was improperly received. Water rights belonging to
land and stock in a ditch corporation are two essentially different
kinds of property. A real estate owner may have the right to water
for the purpose of irrigating his land without owning any ditch
stock, and a stockholder in a ditch company may be without right
to water for irrigation or without land r,' irrigate. Water rights
for irrigation are regarded as real property, and shares of stock in a
corporation are personal property. The deed conveyed all rights in
water pertaining to the land described for the purpose of its irrigation, but it no more conveyed the grantors water stock than it conveyed his horses.
The attaching creditor was held to be the owner of the stock because of failure of purchaser to comply with section 269 G. S. requiring
entry of transfer on company's books in sixty days.2 0 The applicability
of general statutes governing transfers of stock certificates to ditch companies is not questioned.
In a case decided in 190721 a landowner who owned stock in two
different companies (A Co. and A Extension Co.) had executed a trust
deed which described the land and specifically described the stock in A
Company but was silent as to A Extension. The trust deed included the
phrase "all shares of stock in any company" and after default, foreclosure
and resale the buyer claimed to own the stock in A Extension Company.
Ditch was a mutual where each share represented a fraction of water
but was not made appurtenant to any one tract of land. The defendant
contended the stock was personal property and transaction void because
' 9 First National Bank v. Hastings, 7 Colo. App. 129, 42 Pac. 691 (1895).

'Except for the fact that the water was not made appurtenant to any one tract of

land, this case closely resembles the Markham decision hereafter referred to (n. 26).
'Oligarchy Ditch Company v. Farm Investment Co., 40 Colo. 291, 88 Pac. 443.
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trust deed was not foreclosed in five years. The court determined that
the buyer (plaintiff) owned the stock in A Company and treated trust
deed as a chattel mortgage to effect such a result; as to A Extension stock
the decision was for defendant because plaintiff failed to secure possession
of the stock. The court said:
While there are many cases which hold that a water right or
a private ditch may pass with a conveyance of land as appurtenant
thereto, yet we know of no case, and counsel has called our attention to none, wherein it is held that a corporation owning a ditch,
and furnishing the right to carry water to its stockholders only,
must continue to carry water for land which has been conveyed to
a stranger, while the stock which gave the right remained in the
hands of the original owner or had been transferred to other parties. 22.:
24
Next in point of time was the decision in our sister state of Idaho
in a contest to determine stock ownership in a mutual ditch company

which by by-law provided "*

* * water right was dedicated and made

appurtenant to the land involved herein and none other." In holding
ownership to be in mortgagee because of failure of water company to
record its contract, the Idaho court said:
It is contended by appellant that the shares of stock in the
operating company are personal property, and that the water right
passed by assignment of them, and did not become subject to the
mortgage on the land. While shares of stock in an ordinary corporation, organized for profit, are personal property (section 2747,
REV. CODES; State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho, 784, and cases therein
cited on page 802, 156 Pac. 1141), and while this court has held
shares in an irrigation company to be personal property (Watson
v. Molden, 10 Idaho 570, 79 Pac. 503) the fact must not be lost
sight of that a water right is, as heretofore shown, real estate, and
that in case of a mutual irrigation company, not organized for
profit, but for the convenience of its members in the management
of the irrigation system and in the distribution of water to them
for use upon their lands in proportion to their respective interests,
ownership of shares of stock in the corporation is but incidental to
ownership of a water right. Such shares are muniments of title to
'The Oligarchy, Hastings and Oppenlander all were "mutual" companies and in
each case the stock was held to be personal property distinct from the land.
'This decision involved the identical issues of the Markham case (post, n. 26)
except that claimant advanced his claim to ownership on the theory that the stock was
personal property.
'Ireton v. Idaho Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164 Pac. 687 (1917).
It is
referred to because the Olney case emphasi7es it.
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the water right, are inseparable from it, and ownership of them
passes with the title which they evidence.

which is the language quoted in the Comstock decision. This is misleading and unfortunate. The test was not whether the company was or was
not a "mutual," rather the test was:
Furthermore, by the terms of the contract between the state
and appellant and of that between appellant and Lansdown the
water right was dedicated and made appurtenant to the land involved herein and none other.
Two years later, in a case involving a "mutual" ditch company, the
statutes governing transfer of stock certificates generally were again held
applicable to stock in a "mutual" company and no mention was made
25
of the "real estate" characteristics of a share of stock.
Then, in 1940, we see the status of a share of stock in a mutual
ditch company depends upon "the intention" of the parties.26 The trust
deed included certain lands and "any and all water rights thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining which are now or hereafter may be
used on said premises, together with all shares of stock or shares of water
in any ditch * * *."

The stock certificate bore a notation as to use of

water on some of the real estate described in the deed of trust (the decision is not clear as to the exact limitations-apparently other lands than
those in trust deed were also enumerated). Trust deed was foreclosed
(by bank) and it claimed title to shares of stock also claimed by defendant under pledge. Bank asserted title under two principal theories:
(1) that shares of stock are mere muniments of title of a water
right which is real property;
(2) by reason of by-law making stock appurtenant to land.
The court refused relief to the bank and denied the first contention because the precedent cited (Comstock case) was inapplicable, and the second contention because the intention of the parties was to separate the
land and water regardless of the by'law. 27
The third general division heretofore mentioned involves the taxation of the property of the company itself as distinguished from the
313.

'Hexter v. Shahan, 66 Colo. 156, 180 Pac. 92 (1919).
3 Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Markham, 106 Colo. 509, 107 Pac.

(2d)

'We thus have three general situations: (1) Mutual companies which have no
restrictions as to place of use of water-stock is personal property and transferable as
such. (2) Mutual companies which by by-law, stock certificate, or charter limit use
of water to a certain described tract of land---stock is appurtenant to the land and,
ordinarily, passes by deed. (3) A "peculiar situation" where, as in the Markham case.
the court resorts to the time-honored rule of "intention."
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stock it issues. As the writer sees it2s there is no connection whatever
between this situation and that of whether or not stock is an appurtenance to land and passes by tax deed. Anyhow, our court in the Comstock decision cites the Kendrick decision"9 as precedent. The last word
on this phase of the subject is Logan District v. Holt,30 decided in s1943,
so that it is now determined what property is or is not tax exempt.31
The practitioner meets some phase of this problem frequently in
private practice. It is suggested that because of questions which could
otherwise arise it is well: (1) to get possession of the stock certificate,
properly endorsed; (2) include in any conveyance of land a description
of the number of shares and number of certificate involved, and (3) in
case of loan secured by trust deed to handle stock as was done in Oligarchy case supra. In the absence of by-law or other restriction limiting
place of use of water ( 1 ) is or should be controlling in all cases.
'The court saw it differently.
'Kendrick v. Twin Lakes Reservoir Co., 58 Colo. 281, 144 Pac. 884 (1914).
'110 Colo. 253, 133 Pac. (2d) 530.
31
Headgates and dams, the bed of the reservoir, ditches, canals, flumes, area adjacent
to reservoir for protection from erosion, wind, etc., and lands and improvements thereon
for use of the caretaker are all exempt. Liable for taxation are agricultural implements,
machinery and livestock. See Shaw v. Bond, 64 Colo. 366, 171 Pac. 1142 (1918) ;
Antero Reservoir Co. v. Commissioners, 65 Colo. 375, 177 Pac. 148 (1918) ; ibid.,
75 Colo. 131. 225 Pac. 269 (1924), and the Logan and Kendrich cases (supra, notes
29 and 30).

New Translation of Roman Law
Translation into English of the complete body of Roman law,
never done before, is being undertaken by a committee of the nation's
leading Latin scholars and legal critics, of which Dr. Robert S. Rogers,
professor of Latin at Duke University, Durham, N. C., is a member.
The project, expected to require five or six years of work in producing a volume three or four times the size of the King James version of the
Bible, will make available to scholars who do not possess a technical
knowledge of Latin the entire body of Roman law, basis for most of the
law codes of the Western world.
Dr. Clyde Pharr, of the Classical Languages Department of
Vanderbilt University, is heading the committee, which, along with Dr.
Rogers, will include Alfred R. Bellinger of Yale University, noted
historian; A. E. R. Boak of the University of Michigan, historian:
Mason Hammond, of Harvard University, historian; Allan Johnson of
Princeton, historian; Max Radin, expert on Roman law at the University
of California; E. M. Sanford of Sweet Briar College; and Roscoe Pound
of Harvard Law School, and others.
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Again---How Many Times?
BY J. P. HELMAN*
Rule 4 (h) of the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provides for the
publication of summons, and "such publication shall be made at least

once a week for four successive weeks." In my opinion, once a week for
four successive weeks means four times only, and this was the opinion
of Hubert Henry in his article How Many Times?'
Rule 12 C (a) provides that the answer must be made to the summons within twenty days after service of summons, or if copy of complaint be not served with summons or if summons is served without the
state or by publication, within thirty days after service on defendant.
*Of the Grand Junction bar.
'19 Dicta 231 (1942).
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Rule 4 (h) provides that service by publication shall be complete on the
day of the last publication. The defendant certainly has plenty of time
to appear, even though the summons is published only four times, since
three weeks elapse between first and last publications, and the party has
thirty days thereafter, or over fifty days in all.
Section 6, Chapter 130, 1935 C. S. A., provides that except as
otherwise provided by law in express terms or by necessary implication,
daily, weekly, semiweekly and triweekly newspapers shall all be equally
competent for the publication of all legal notices and advertisements;
that where publication of any legal notice at intervals of less than one
week is required by law, then publication once each week on the same
week day in any such daily, weekly, semiweekly, or triweekly newspaper for the required number of times shall constitute publication in
accordance with the law.
It then states that for the purpose of defining and clarifying ambiguities in the various statutes * * * but not for the purpose of increasing
any period of publication or the number of publications required by any
statute, the meaning and intent of any law governing the publication of
legal notices and advertisements, except as otherwise expressly provided,
is declared to be as follows:
1. Where publication for ten days is required, publication
once each week for three successive weeks * * * is sufficient.
2. Where publication for two weeks is required, then publication once each week for three successsive weeks * * * shall be
sufficient.
3. Where publication for three weeks is required, then publication once each week for four successive weeks * * * shall be
sufficient.
4. Where publication for four weeks is required, then publication once each week for five successive weeks * * * shall be sufficient.
5. Where publication for five weeks is required, then publication once each week for six successive weeks * * * shall be sufficient.
6. Where publication for thirty days is required, then publication once each week for six successive weeks * * * shall be sufficient.
7. Where publication for more than thirty days or five weeks
is required, then publication once each week for a period such that
the interval elapsing between first and last publication, shall be
equal to the period of publication prescribed by law shall be sufficient.
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The question arises, what does "once each week for four successive
weeks" mean? It seems that common sense would dictate that it means
simply four publications, once each during four calendar weeks. This is
accomplished by four publications even though only three weeks' time
elapses between the first and last publication. This has been so interpreted in Smith vs. Collis, 42 Mont. 350, 112 Pac. 1070 (1910), Ann.
Cas. 1912 A 1158, and Scilley vs. Red Lodge Rosebud Irr. Dist., 83
Mont. 282, 272 Pac. 543 (1928).
I have looked up the meaning of "once a week for four successive
weeks" under title Process, Key No. 106, in the COLORADO AND PACIFIC
DIGEST, and find the following:
Utah-The court ordered a citation to be published once a week
for four successive weeks. There were four regular insertions of the notice in a weekly newspaper. It was held to comply with the order. Wells
vs. Kelly, 11 Utah 421, 40 Pac. 705 (1895).
Washington-The statute provided for publication of summons
not less than once a week for six consecutive weeks. Publication made
once in each of six consecutive weeks was held sufficient. State vs. Superior Court of Pierce County, 6 Wash. 352, 33 Pac. 827 (1893).
Montana-In Smith us. Collis, supra, the court considered the
matter at some length, but concluded that four insertions, where the
code provided for publication "once a week for four successive weeks"
was sufficient because that section of the code further provided that service of summons is complete on the day of the fourth publication, so that
it clearly contemplated only four insertions. However, the court referred
to interpretations by other courts, including Colorado in Calvert vs. Calvert, 15 Colo. 390, 24 Pac. 1043 (1890). Montana had the same rule
as we, to count the first day and exclude the last day in computing any
period of notice, and the court pointed out that the greatest period of
time which could elapse between the first and fourth publication was
twenty-one days under this rule. From this reasoning court held that it
was self evident that the statute did not contemplate that there should
be a period of four weeks, or twenty-eight days elapse between the first
and fourth publications.
The matter is settled, in my opinion, by Calvert vs. Calvert, supra,
which I have searched down to date in SHEPARD'S CITATIONS and have
found no further cases under the heading. In this case, the question was
whether service had been obtained by publication of summons which
had been published in four issues of a weekly paper, the first insertion
being December 19, 1884, and the fourth and last insertion January 9,
1885. On page 395 the court states, "Must the language 'once a week
for four successive weeks' be construed to mean four weeks of seven days
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each, to-wit twenty-eight days? This we are inclined to answer in the
negative." The court then cites Brown vs. Tucker, 7 Colo. 30, 1 Pac.
221 (1883), as the authority for the proposition that the ten days then
necessary to complete the service began to run from the last publication.
It then cites Skiles vs. Baker, 6 Colo. 295, where the first publication was
November 13 and the last December 4. This covered only four insertions, so that the publication ran only twenty-two days and was held
sufficient.
It is my firm conviction that Calvert v. Calvert, supra, not having
been overruled, is the law of this state, and that publication "once a week
for four successive weeks" means just what it says-four insertions. The
same way for "once a week for three successive weeks," or any other
number, and that any different interpretation has been merely to appease
the newspapers and give them additional printing fees at the expense of
clients.
ESTATES (1935 C. S. A. CHAPTER 176)
Section 197, Chapter 176, 1935 C. S. A., as amended in 1941,2
provides that notice to creditors shall be published "once a week during
each of four successive calendar weeks." This unquestionably means four
times only, and is so stated in Mr. Henry's article in DICTA, supra.
Incidentally, this notice must be published within fifteen days of
the issuance of letters of administration.
Section 227, as amended in 1941,3 coverng notice of final settlement, provides "once a week during each of four successive calendar
weeks." This again means only four times. DICTA, supra.
Section 13 covers publication of hearing on petition for determination of heirship, and provides, "once each week for four successive
weeks.". Many are publishing five times through overcaution. It seems
to me very clear that this means the same as "once a week during each of
four successive calendar weeks," and that four publications are ample and
sufficient.
Section 19 covers publication for determination of heirship where
the value of the property is less than $2,000, and provides that notice
shall be "published at least three successive weeks." It will be noticed
that it does not say once each week for three successive weeks, and here
the statute might be construed to mean that the notice must be published
for a period of three weeks, which of course requires four publications in
order to cover, particularly in view of Section 6, Chapter 130.
'S. L. '41, c. 235, §18, p. 910.
'S. L. '41, c. 235, §17, p. 913.
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Section 29, descent of property after one year, provides for publication "once each week for four successive weeks." This, in my opinion,
means publication only four times for the reasons given.
Section 51, notice of the probate of a will, provides for notice to
be published "four successive weeks," This is a period of four successive
weeks, so that one must publish five times in order to cover a period of
four weeks between the first and last publications. This is the conclusion
of Mr. Henry in DICTA, supra.
Section 166 covers the sale of real estate and provides that publication shall be "once each week for two successive weeks." This requires
only two publications.
EXECUTION AND FORECLOSURE

Section 47, Chapter 93, 1935 C. S. A., provides for the sale of
lands under execution and that such sale shall have been previously advertised "for the space of twenty days." This requires the advertising
to cover a period of twenty days. The interpretative statute, Chapter
130, does not specifically provide for twenty-day period, but in view of
its express statement of not being prepared for the purpose of increasing
the number of publications and its final declaration that where more than
thirty days or five weeks publication is required, once each week for a
period such that the interval elapsing between first and last publication
shall be equal to the period of publication prescribed indicates that four
weekly publications will be sufficient, since the period of time elapsed
between the first and last publication would be twenty-one days.
Section 57, Chapter 93, 1935 C. S. A., covers sale of chattels and
states, "No goods or chattels shall be sold by virtue of any execution
unless previous notice of such sale shall have been given for at least ten
days successively in the same manner as required in the sale of real estate
upon execution. Since a period of ten days is required, there must be
three publications, since otherwise ten days would not elapse between
the first and third publication.
With respect to foreclosure of mortgage or trust deed, where the
foreclosure is in a court of record and the sale is under special execution,
one must follow the provisions of Section 47, Chapter 93, in the sale of
lands under execution, and publish four times, but when the foreclosure
is by the public trustee, it is governed by Section 69, Chapter 40, 1935
C. S.A., which provides that all deeds of trust shall prescribe a period of
advertising notice of sale weekly in some newspaper of general circulation
which publication shall not in any case be for less than four weeks.
Since this publication must be for a period of four weeks, it requires five
insertions.
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DIVORCE

Rule 81 (a). These rules do not govern procedure and practice in any special statutory proceedings insofar as they are incompetent or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by the
applicable statute. Where the applicable statute provides for procedure under a former code of civil procedure, such procedure shall
be in accordance with these rules.
These rules do not govern procedure and practice in
(b)
actions in divorce or separate maintenance insofar as they are incompetent or in conflict with the4 procedure and practice provided
by the present applicable statutes.
Section 4, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A., provides that if service is
made in the state, the defendant in a divorce action has thirty days within
which to plead. In case of service outside the state, the defendant has
fifty days from date of service.
Section 5 provides for service by publication by order of the court
in the same manner and with like effect as is now provided by law for
publication of summons in cases of attachment.
Rule 102 (f) of the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provides that
the writ of attachment now shall be served in like manner and under the
same conditions as provided in these rules for service of process, that is, a
summons. It also provides that service shall be deemed completed at the
expiration of the same period as is provided for service of process. However, this rule was adopted after the statute governing service in a divorce
action, so apparently in such actions we must follow the old CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, §45, which provided for substituted service (publication) in cases of attachment. This section of the old code provided
that after the return is made that the defendant after diligent search cannot be found and not less than ten days after issuance of summons, publication shall be made by order of the court, once a week for four successive weeks, and service shall be complete at the expiration of ten days
from the date of last publication.
It is, therefore, my conclusion that in a divorce action one must first
comply with the old code by having a return made that the defendant
cannot be found, obtain an order from the court for publication of summons, publish the summons once each week for four weeks, that is, four
insertions. The defendant has ten days after the last publication before
service is complete and fifty days thereafter in which to answer or plead.
'Rules of Civil Procedure (1941).
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What Divorce Statutes Are Now in Effect

in Colorado?
BY HAROLD B.

WAGNER*

The war work committee of the American Bar Association recently asked for a short digest of the Colorado laws on divorce. On first
thought this seemed simple to prepare; all that was necessary was to
make a digest or summary of the first thirty-two sections of Chapter 56,
1935 C. S. A. A little investigation, however, soon indicated that there
was a divergence of opinion on the subject among various members of
the bar, particularly on two points:
First: Since Section 9 of Chapter 56 contains provisions for appointment of an attorney for a defaulting defendant, trial by jury, and
the necessity for the plaintiff's personal presence at the trial. Is this section now the law, or has part or all of it been repealed?
Second: When the summons is to be published, may we follow the
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, or does the code still govern?
FIRST POINT

The effectiveness of Section 9 appears to have been in doubt for a
long time. A review of the history of our legislation is necessary for an
understanding of the problem and its solution. In 1893 the legislature
passed an act on the subject of divorce and alimony, complete with specifications of the grounds, practice, procedure, etc. Section 5 of this act
appeared as Section 2119, R. S. '08, Section 5600, C. L. '21, and Section 9, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A. After 1893 there were some minor
changes and in 1915 the legislature passed a new "Act Concerning Marriage and Divorce," (S. L. '15, c. 74) which did not contain all the provisions of Section 5 of the laws of 1893. In 1917 the legislature passed
another act on the subject which appeared to be a complete and workable
unit, likewise omitting some of the provisions of Section 5 of the 1893
law. In 1921 the editors of the COMPILED LAWS included Section 5 of
the 1893 statute with the comment that it was not clear whether certain
of its provisions had been repealed in 1917. A similar comment was
made by the compilers of the 1935 COLORADO STATUTES ANNOTATED.
In support of the continuing validity of Section 5 of the 1893 act
it may be said:
1. None of the later legislation contains any precise words
repealing this section, and certain of its provisions are not in irreconcilable conflict with any particular word or sentence of the later
statutes;
*Of the Denver bar.

Member of the Lawyers' War Emergency Committee.
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2. Repeals by implication are not favored;
3. The compilers of the 1921 and 1935 statutes, acting
under legislative authority, carried this section forward as part of
the living law of the state;
4. Several cases have referred to this section as being in effect.
Among these cases are Thum v. Thum, 105 Colo. 352, 355, 978
Pac. (2d) 279 (1939), and Myers v. Myers, 110 Colo. 412, 416,
135 Pac. (2d) 235 (1943).
5. Many of our courts and lawyers have proceeded on the
theory that some parts of this section are in effect.
These considerations all have validity and similar ones have been
used as guides in many instances. Their effect, however, appears to have
been destroyed by the decision in Shaif, et al. v. Shaft, 72 Colo. 184,
186, 210 Pac. 400 (1922). In that case (as distinguished from the
Thum and Myers cases) the question of the effect of the 1917 act on
prior divorce legislation was directly in issue and was definitely passed
upon. Our supreme court held that the 1917 act "* * * covers the whole

subject matter and was intended as a substitute for the former statute,
and for that reason must be deemed a repeal of the earlier act." This
follows the rule of statutory construction that:
Where a later act covers the whole subject matter of earlier
acts, embraces new provisions, and plainly shows that it was intended, not only as a substitute for the earlier acts, but to cover the
whole subject then considered by the legislature, and to prescribe
the only rules in respect thereto, it operates as a repeal of all former
statutes relating to such subject matter. The rule applies not only
where the former acts are inconsistent or in conflict with-the new
act, but also even where the former acts are not necessarily repugnant in express terms, or in all respects, to the new act. 1
The Shaft case was cited with approval in Krogh v. Danielson, 73
Colo. 135, 138, 213 Pac. 996 (1923).
It is generally agreed that the parts of the section in question requiring a jury in any event, and the appointment of an attorney for a2
defaulting defendant, have been repealed by Section 8 of the 1917 act.
Under the Shaft case it seems inescapable that the rest of the present Section 9 has also been repealed and that the plaintiff is not required to be
personally present at the trial of a divorce case.
1

59 C. J. 919 (1932).
'The appointment of attorneys to represent non-appearing defendants is required
by § 1, of Rule XX of the rules of the District Court of the Second Judicial District
(Denver).
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Under normal conditions the question of the plaintiff's personal
appearance at the trial might not be considered as of great practical importance, it being usually feasible for the plainitff to appear. In many
cases this is not true in war time, as the following set of facts will illustrate. Shortly before induction into the army, a young man married a
young woman on the spur of the moment. Returning home on his first
leave, he found that she had not been faithful to him and was chiefly
interested in drawing her allotment of fifty dollars a month. His lawyer
started an action for divorce and obtained personal service on the defendant, but before the waiting period of thirty days was completed
the plaintiff was required to return to his station, apparently without any
further prospect of obtaining a leave prior to going overseas. Many such
cases have contained elements which required the plaintiff's problem to
receive the most sympathetic consideration.
Some of the courts have proceeded on the theory that the section in
question is effective insofar as it requires the personal presence of the
plaintiff at the trial, but they have construed this to mean that the plaintiff's deposition may be taken after jurisdiction over the defendant has
been obtained, and that the reading of this deposition at the trial is the
equivalent of personal presence. Such a construction seems to violate the
plain and simple words of the statute, would be difficult, if not impossible, to support under the authorities, and now seems unnecessary in view
of the holding in the Shaft case.
The propriety of proceedings on the plaintiff's deposition is
strengthened by Section 20, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A., which provides
that the validity of a divorce decree may not be questioned after one year
from the date of the interlocutory decree, except for lack of jurisdiction,
or for fraud.
Under the Shaft decision, Sections 21, 22, 23, and 24, Chapter 56,
1935 C. S. A., may not be regarded as effective, but they are not of
fundamental importance. Section 21 provides the circumstances under
which a woman may sue without costs; Section 22 legalizes divorces
granted by a jury of less than six; Section 23 validates decrees which
might have been questioned because of residence, the decisions of other
courts, etc.; and Section 24 sustains divorces granted by the probate
courts.
SECOND POINT

Strict compliance with the law relating to publication of summons
is relatively easy, but failure to comply may result seriously for either or
both of the parties. Section 5 of the present law provides, among other
things:
The court or the judge thereof shall, if satisfied of the good
faith of the plaintiff, cause the summons to be published in the
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same manner and with like effect as is now provided by law for
publication of summons in cases of attachment.
This section was passed in 1917. At. that time the provision for
publishing summons in attachment cases was contained in Section 45 of
the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. This paragraph of the code was later
amended and the 1927 act was carried forward into the 1935 compilation. The corresponding paragraph in the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
is Rule 4 (g) and (h). The code paragraph was the only law on the
subject existing in 1917; ther was no supreme court rule relating to
publication of summons.
The principal differences between the code provision existing in
19 17 and the present rules are these:
1. Under the old procedure the order for publication was
made by the clerk of the court, and not by the judge;
2. It was formerly required that the summons be issued for
ten days and that a return be made thereon that the defendant, after
diligent search, could no tbe found;
3. The affidavit of publication had to be signed by the plaintiff, or one of the plaintiffs, except when the plaintiff was a nonresident or absent from the state, when it could be made by his
attorney; and
4. Under the rule as it existed in 1917, service was not complete until the expiration of ten days from the date of the last publication; whereas, it is now complete on the day of the last publication.
There are other minor differences in wording, but the principal
changes are as set forth above.
It seems clear that the code l5rovision, as it existed in 1917, must be
followed. The rule is:
A statute which refers to and adopts the provisions of a prior
statute is not repealed or affected by the subsequent repeal of the
prior statute.3
Many cases are cited, including the two entitled Schwenhe v. Union
DepotandR. R. Co., 7 Colo. 512, 4 Pac. 905 (1884), and 7 Colo. 521,
5 Pac. 816 (1884). In these cases the court was called upon to pass on
the validity of a special federal statute which adopted certain provisions
of a prior general statute which, in turn, was later repealed. The court
approved the general rule and went on to say:
A local and special statute which adopts, by reference, provisions relating to procedure from an existing general law, is not nec-59 C. J. 937 (1932).
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essarily abrogated or affected by the
subsequent repeal of the act
4
containing the provisions adopted.
The rules of construction laid down in this case have been followed
in a number of subsequent decisions.
The rule is further stated:
As a rule the adoption of a statute by reference is construed
as an adoption of the law as it existed at the time the adopting
statute was passed, and therefore is not affected by any subsequent
modification or repeal of the statute adopted, unless a contrary
intention is clearly manifested. "
Some lawyers hold to the opinion that the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE govern the practice in all our courts of record. The rules themselves do not assume to be this sweeping. Rule 1 (a) states that the
rules govern the procedure in all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil
nature, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule
81. Rule 81 (a) refers to special statutory proceedings, 81 (b) refers
to divorce and separate maintenance, and 81 (c) refers to appeals from
county to district court. Paragraph (b), supra, states:
These rules do not govern procedure and practice in actions in
divorce or separate maintenance insofar as they are inconsistent or
in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by the present
applicable statutes.
It is to be noted that this section omits the following sentence which
is contained in the preceding and parallel section on special statutory
proceedings:
Where the applicable statute provides for procedure under a
former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with these rules.
It has been suggested that Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 108 Colo.
538, 120 Pac. (2d) 641 (1941), states the law as being different from
the conclusions set forth above. In that case the husband, plaintiff in a
divorce case, filed a dismissal before any cross-complaint had been made.
The lower court declined to enter the order of dismsisal and this was
reversed by the supreme court under Rule 41 (a) (1), with the observation:
If we assume that Civil Code Sec. 184 controls, still the case
must be regarded as dismissed.
'Schwenke v. Union Depot and R. R. Co., supra, 7 Colo. at 515.
59 C. J. 1060 (1932).
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The divorce statute itself contains no prov1s1ons for dismissal of
such actions. and the general practice was necessarily followed , in entire
conformance with the recognized laws of divorce and procedurr.
Careful compliance with the laws is indispensable in cases involving
substituted service. Non-compliance with the requirements in any important particular will re.nder void all proceedings dependent on the
court's jurisdiction over the person attempted to be served. It will be
noted that Section 20, Chapter 56, 1935 C. S. A., supra, protects decrees from attack after one year, except cases in which the court did not
obtain jurisdiction of the parties, or for a fraud perpetrated upon the
court. Obviously, it is of utmost importance that the defendant be
before the court. Regardless of what the court may attempt to do, it is
elementary that any decree or judgment against him is void if jurisdiction has not been obtained according to the law. Procedure in divorce
cases should be followed with special care; otherwise bigamy, illegitimacy, litigation over property rights. and other disasters may result.

Book Review
TRAFFIC COURTS. By George Warren, Foreword by Arthur T. Vanderbilt;
1942, Boston; Little, Brown and Company, xxvii, 280, $4.0 0.

This work was sponsored by the National Committee on Traffic
Law Enforcement and was published under the joint auspices of that
body and the National Conference of Judicial Councils. It is one of the
volumes of the judicial administration series of which Roscoe Pound.
formerl y dean of th e Harvard Law School. is editor.
Mr. Warren started a nation-wide survey of traffic courts i.n 193 8.
The present volume is based upon his report of that survey, made in
September, 1940. The survey made by Mr. Warren was thorough and
comprehensive. He h as studied both the traffic laws of each state and the
laws governing the courts that enforce such la ws. The material for the
report was obtained by personal investigation and by conferences w ith
traffic judges and court officials in all the states, supplemented by questionnaires sent to attorneys general. traffic judges and justices o f the
peace.
Many of the problems which led to the making of this survey have
been abated by the train of events accelerated by the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor D ecember 7, 194 I. but they are likely to be revived with
the cessation of hostilities and the consequent ending of tire and gasoline
shortages. In fact, the accident toll in D enver at the turn of the year
makes one doubt that these problems have been diminished.
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The conclusions vf Mr. Warren are set out in a summary of recommendations preceding the main part of the work. It is difficult to sele~t
the most important of these recommendations. Many of them are. obvious. The need for putting others into effect may be apparent, but it may
seem that they can be applied only with great difficulty, or they may not
appear to be applicable to the conditions found in some states. The application of some of these recommendations to our. spars~ly populated,
territorially extensive, western states may seem especially difficult. These
recommendations all merit study and thought.
Ten requirements for enforceable traffic laws set out in chapter II ,
page 16, might be condensed to three, i. e., they should be clear, reasonable a.nd uniform. Uniformity of traffic rules probably would result in
the abandonment of the unique right of w ay rule enforced in D enver.
Traffic cases are not adapted to the routine of criminal offenses,
although those brought for violations of state laws are criminal in form.
Usually only a single issue is involved. Often there is no extraneous or
impartial testimony, and the traffic law violator does not consider himself
a criminal. Except for accident cases, they can be disposed of rapidly.
Mr. Warren says that the handling of these cases should be uniform over
large areas, and that cooperation with thr police in keeping records is
helpful both to that department and to the court. The keeping of complete and intelligible records is very important, as the chief function of
the traffic laws is to deter future offenses in order to promote public
safety. Complete records can be of great help in ascertaining the causes
of traffic violations a.nd ::tccidents, and also in detecting the repeated and
persistent violator.
Violations bureaus, or "cafeteria courts," when properly administered, are of great help in medium sized and large cities. In many instances a great proportion of the cases are disposed of in these offices. Mr.
Warren recommends that a primary prerequisite in all violation.~ l,ureaus
should be the use of a written plea of guilty a.nd wiaver of trial. This
will insure the realization by a defendant that he admits and pleads
guilty to the infraction of a law. D enver is said to be one of the comparatively few cities where this procedure is required. The schedule of
penaltie_s should be fixed and should not be made capable of variation by
the clencal personnel. The "cafeteria court" should not be made into a
mere device for obtaining revenue.
~udges and court officials list seven faults common to lawyers in the
handhng of traffic cases. The faults listed seem to be those of which lawyers are accused in the handling of all sorts of cases. Some of them were
oointed out by another Warren in that legal classic T en Thousand a

Year.

The " fix," or use of influence for escaping the normal legal procedure and penalty for traffic violations, is said to be "singly the most
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pernicious influence and detrimental practice in the field of traffic law
enforcement." The man who can "get away with it" is likely to relax
his driving standards and the man who has no " pull" is likely to become
resentful and antagonistic when h e knows that others are not penalized
as he may be. Both attitudes weaken traffic enforcement and are injurious
to public safety. The "fix" is a petty, but particularly vexatious, form
of special privilege.
Punishment of traffic offenders can be effected in more ways than
the usually prescribed penalties for law infractions. The most deterrent
punishment appears to be the suspension of driving licenses and privileges. The author recommends that the suspension a.nd revocation of
drivers licenses should be a function of the state motor vehicle administration, with provisions to make recommendations of the judges trying
traffic cases effective.
Adequate drivers records are necessary to single out and properly
punish the repeater or habitual offender, for these persistent violators
form the greatest me.nace to public safety. While it has been said that
many habitual offenders are never caught, the law of probabilities would
appear to disprove this conclusion and show that on the whole and in
the long run violators are apprehended in proportion to the number and
degree of their offenses.
One of the most interesting chapters in the book is number XIII.
concerning justices of the peace. In most states traffic cases may be heard
in a number of courts, but the justice of the peace is the officer most commonly used for their trial. Colorado is one of the states in which most
traffic cases, except in Denver and a few cities or towns having police
magistrates, are tried in "J. P ." courts. Few lawyers need to be told
much about the "justice" court or "J. P. " system, yet a reading of this
chapter will be useful in focusing the spotlight of thought on these
officers.
Two stateme.nts in this chapter may be misinterpreted, so far as they
concern Colorado. Mr. Warren says. page 202. note 5, that Colorado is
one of five states which provide salaries for justices of the peace. Unfortunately, the p rovisions for salaries apply only to a few populous justice
court precincts-probably not more than six. One safely can say that
more than ninety-five per cent of the justices of the peace in Colorado
are compensated by the fees of their offices. In note 2, page 223 , Colorado is listed as one of the states which furnishes justices of the peace with
court rooms. This is true in many of the larger county seats and in some
other towns and cities. Also, in some county seats where justices of the
peace do not have regular quarters assigned to them , they may be allowed
to use the accomodations provided for other courts for the trial of cases.
But a large majority of the justices of the peace in Colorado are not
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furnished court rooms or other accomodations, and hold court in their
homes, in the back rooms of stores, or in other places that may be found
convenient.
Almost everyone will agree with the conclusion of Mr. Warren
that the justice of the peace system is both an inefficient and an ineffective
means for the trial of traffic violations. Granting the truth of this
statement we are faced with the problem of reorganizing the justice of the
peace and other court systems so as to handle traffic cases more effective! y.
Mr. Warren recommends that the justice of the peace be replaced for the
trial of traffic cases by a state-wide system of regular courts with trained
personnel functioning on a circuit basis from centrally located seats and
under the supervision of a chief judge. In the absence of such a thorough
reorganization Mr. Warren recommends that the traffic case docket be
separated from that of other cases. He also says that merely abolishing
the hundreds of casual courts scattered throughout almost every state
would work great improvement. Such a plan should enable each court
to be properly housed.
A mode of reorganization which might be satisfactory in a small.
densely populated, predominantly urban state might not be practical in a
large, sparsely populated, rural state. Consideration would have to be
given to the mode of reorganization to fit a state such as Colorado,
which has one metropolitan community, a few medium sized cities, and a
great area of wide open spaces. It might be found impractical even to
abolish all of the 350 justices of the peace in this state and concentrate
the handling of traffic cases arising outside of Denver in the county
courts. The channeling of such cases through the county courts in
Colorado would not necessarily result in their trial before trained
judges, as not more than twenty-three of Colorado's sixty-three county
judges are lawyers. According to Martindale, three Colorado countiesCuster, Hinsdale and Mineral-have no lawyers, and it appears that
in a number of other counties where one or two lawyers are listed they
reside in adjoining counties where they maintain their principal offices.
Any proposed reorganization of the court system should avoid setting up
traffic courts as an entirely separate and self-sufficient judicial organization. They should be fitted into the general court system of the state.
Too many states have followed the easy way of setting up new or
separate courts to meet special problems without consideration of their
effect upon or relation to the existing courts.
Mr. Warren's .work furnishes a greatly needed review of a
problem of judicial administration and law enforcement which was
particularly troublesome in the years just before World War II and
which is likely to rise again soon after the termination of this conflict.

v

"I'm not simple enough to think that one man can go down there to
Washington and cure all the troubles of this country all by himself," said
Dean Gillespie in a recent talk, "but I want to tell you right now that if you
send me down to Washington, you're sending ONE vote for plain, honest,
common sense-.the kind of common sense that made this country what it is
today-the greatest country the world has ever known."
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